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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
-repair. A right to enter for the purpose of making repairs or a gratuitous
custom of making repairs should be sufficient protection for his inter-
ests, yet either of these methods will probably not be enough "control"
to hold him liable. As a last-ditch effort the landlord might try to
convince the courts of the basic differences between the tenant, invitee,
and stranger cases. Unfortunately, Ohio courts have been indiscriminate
in citing authorities; commingling has proved disastrous.
THOMAS A. DUGAN
Impeaching the Credibility of a Witness
By Showing Prior Criminal Convictions
At the common-law any person convicted of an infamous crime
(treason, felony and the crimen falsi)1 was incompetent to testify as a
witness. 2  The rationale behind the rule was that such a person was
considered,
... morally too corrupt to be trusted to testify; - so reckless of the dis-
tincton between truth and falsehood, and insensible to the restraining force
of an oath, as to render it extremely improbable that he [would] speak the
truth at all.3
By statute the disqualification for conviction of a crime has been al-
most universally abrogated.4 In Ohio civil actions this disqualification
was removed by statute in 1853.5 Today the successor to that statute
provides:
All persons are competent witnesses except those of unsound mind,
and children under ten years of age who appear incapable of receiving just
impressions of the facts and transactions respecting which they are ex-
amined or of relating them truthfully.8
Crimen falsi is a general designation of a class of offenses including those which
involve deceit or falsification and offenses affecting the public administration of
justice. Examples of these offenses are forgery, counterfeiting, using false weights
or measures and perjury. BLACK, LAw DIcTIONARY 446 (4th ed. 1951).
"The meaning of this term fcrimen falsi) at common-law is not well defined."
BoUVIER, LAw DICTIONARY 256 (1946).
2 GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE § 372-73 (1850); See Kornreich v. Industrial Fire Ins.
Co., 132 Ohio St. 78, 87, 5 N.E.2d 153, 157 (1936); Webb v. State, 29 Ohio St
351, 358 (1876).
3 GREENLEAF, EVIDENcE § 372 (1850).
'McCORMIcK, EVIDENCE 5 43 (1954).
r51 OHIO LAWS 57 (1853). See Is re Lieberman, 163 Ohio St. 35, 37, 125 N.E.2d
328, 329 (1955).
'OHIO REV. CODE § 2317.01.
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In criminal cases the disqualification was removed by statute in 1869.
The successor to that statute reads:
No person is disqualified as a witness in a criminal prosecution ...
by reason of his conviction of a crime...
Today the conviction of a crime may be introduced in evidence for
impeaching the credibility of a witness.9 It is used to test his truth-
telling ability - his veracity. In Ohio the introduction of the prior
conviction -is expressly authorized in criminal cases. The statute reads:
Such... conviction... may be shown for the purpose of affecting the
credibility of such witness.0
Although there is no similar provision -in the Code authorizing the in-
troduction of the prior conviction in a civil case, this evidence is still
relevant and admissible in Ohio to impeach the credibility of the witness
in a civil case." Numerous Ohio cases have allowed the fact of a prior
conviction to be elicited in a civil case in order to impeach the credibility
of a witness.12
CoNVIcToNs THAT MAY BE SHOWN
There are conflicting rules in different jurisdictions as to what kind
of convictions may be used for impeachment purposes. In England
"any felony or misdemeanor" is allowed to be shown.'8  Some states
hold that conviction of "crime' or "any crime" is competent to be in-
troduced.' 4  Other states limit the introduction in evidence to convic-
766 OHmo LA s 308 (1869). See In re Lieberman, 163 Ohio St. 35, 37, 125
N.E.2d 328, 329 (1955).
s Omo REV. CODE § 2945.42.
03 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 926 (3d ed. 1940). The conviction may be shown on
trial by producing a copy of the journal entry, or as most states allow, by extracting
an admission of the conviction on cross-examination. See 4 WIGMORE, EvIDENCE
§ 1270 (3d ed. 1940); McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 43 (1954). Cross-examination
for eliciting the fact of conviction is permissible in Ohio. See Kornreich v. Indus-
trial Fire Ins. Co., 132 Ohio St. 78, 5 N.E.2d 153 (1936).
" OHIO REv. CODE § 2945.42.
'See this discussed in Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Rambo, 59 Fed. 75, 78 (6th
Cir. 1893) where the court had to decide what was the Ohio law governing the
competency of witnesses in reference to convictions of crime.
"Kornreich v. Industrial Fire Ins. Co., 132 Ohio St. 78, 5 N.E.2d 153 (1936);
Stover v. Yoakum, 69 Ohio L. Abs. 51, 109 N.E.2d 87 (Ct. App. 1952) (Dicta);
State v. Liff, 86 Ohio App. 396, 87 N.E.2d 917 (1948); Killian v. Cleveland Ry.
Co., 10 Ohio L. Abs. 14 (Ct. App. 1930); Koeborle v. Green, 6 Ohio L. Abs. 56
(Ct. App. 1927); August v. Finnerty, 20 Ohio C.C. Dec. 330, 10 C.C.R. (n.s.)
433 (1908).
"Criminal Procedure Act, 1865, 28 & 29 VICT. 6, c. 18.
"State v. Cioffe, 128 NJ.L. 342, 355, 26 A.2d 57, 65 (1942); Coslow v. State, 83
Okla. Crim. 378, 385, 177 P.2d 518, 522 (1947).
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dons of an "infamous crime."' 5  Still other states hold that if misde-
meanors are to be considered, the crime must at least be one involving
"moral turpitude."' 6 In some states it is left to the trial judge's discretion
to decide whether the particular conviction substantially affects the credi-
bility of the witness.' 7
The latest Supreme Court pronouncement in Ohio, Korreich v.
Industrial Fire Ins. Co.,' 8 states that cross-examination dealing with
prior convictions should be limited to those offenses which, as a matter
of law, do affect credibility, that is, treason, felony and crimen falsi. In
this case it was also said in dicta that it would be "unfair" to ask the
witness, for the purpose of affecting his credibility, whether or not he
had been convicted of assault and battery, as the nature of this offense
in no way reflects upon credibility.' 9
A much earlier Supreme Court case stated that a conviction, to be
admissible, must be one which, before the enactment of the statute re-
moving the disability of the witness in criminal cases, would have dis-
qualified the person from testifying as a witness 20 The court then con-
cluded that the conviction of a violation of a city ordinance punishing
acts which are not defined and punished as crimes 'by the State legisla-
ture never disqualified a person from testifying and therefore such con-
viction could not be introduced to impeach the witness.21  In still an-
other Supreme Court case, Harper v. State,22 it was held that it was
competent to show "convictions of high crimes and misdemeanors, [and]
convictions under state and federal laws" for the purpose of affecting
credibility.
This latter statement seems to have been interpreted -by lower courts
to mean that any conviction of a violation of a state statute may be
shown to impeach credibility. Some Ohio cases have held that it is per-
missible to ask the witness if he has -been convicted of any offense
under the State law, whether the same is a misdemeanor or felony.
23
'People v. Thomas, 393 Ill. 573, 581, 67 N.E.2d 192, 196 (1946); Common-
wealth v. Kostan, 349 Pa. 560, 566, 37 A.2d 606, 609 (1944).
"
8 State v. Jenness, 143 Me. 380, 383, 62 A.2d 867, 868 (1948); Rylee v. State,
131 Tex. Crim. 127, 130, 96 S.W.2d 988, 989 (1936).
'Burgess v. State, 161 Md. 162, 173, 155 Ad. 153, 157 (1931); Zimmerman v.
Goldberg, 277 Mich. 134, 136, 268 N.W. 837, 838 (1936).
- 132 Ohio St. 78, 90, 5 N.E.2d 153, 158 (1936).
" Ibid.
"Coble v. State, 31 Ohio St. 100, 102 (1876).
Ibid.
21106 Ohio St. 481, 484, 140 N.E. 364, 365 (1922).
'Killian v. Cleveland Ry. Co., 10 Ohio L Abs. 14 (Ct. App. 1930); Koeborle v.
Green, 6 Ohio L Abs. 56 (Ct. App. 1927).
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One case held that it was competent to cross-examine the witness as
to convictions for having defaced license plates, for failure to register
an automobile, and for permitting an unlicensed operator to operate his
automobile - all misdemeanors. 4  A recent common pleas decision
has gone so far as to hold that a conviction for operating a motor
vehicle while drunk is a conviction of a crime designated as crimen falsi
and is well within the category of "high crimes and misdemeanors" as
stated in the Harper case.2 5
The interpretation of the Ohio courts as to what kind of convictions
may -be shown for the purpose of impeaching the credibility of a witness
thus seems exceedingly liberal and in no way limited to convictions which
do in fact have a bearing on credibility. This is unfortunate as such
an interpretation gives rise to very serious problems.
PROBLEMS CREATED BY THE PRESENT RULE
In a criminal case, when the accused takes the stand, he is subject
to the same tests for impeaching his credibility as is any other witness 26
since he is a witness in his own behalf. If the prosecution -is allowed to
introduce prior convictions to impeach the accused's credibility, the jury
is liable to convict the accused on his "record." If the conviction is not
a serious one which bears on the truth-telling ability of the witness it
should be excluded as it will only delay the trial proceedings and con.
fuse the issues. It will also very likely prejudice the jury against the de-
fendant. Although the evidence of the conviction will probably be
limited by proper instructions to the purpose for which it is introduced,
namely testing credibility, it takes no astute mind to realize that juries
do not always limit the evidence to this purpose. They receive'the evi-
dence of the prior conviction and throw it into the "pot" with all the
other facts in the case and decide guilt or innocence. The jury may
very possibly conclude that because of the prior conviction,
-.. the accused is the kind of man who would commit the crime on
charge, or even that he ought to be put away without too much concern
with present guilt.7
It seems that if the conviction is of a serious crime the jury should
be entitled to know of the conviction in most cases so as to -be in a better
position to evaluate the testimony of the accused. If the conviction were
for first or second degree murder it would seem plausible that the jury
should be made aware of the fact that they are being urged to believe
'
4State v. Polhamus, 62 Ohio L Abs. 113, 106 N.E.2d 646 (Ct. App. 1951).
"State v. Hamm, 62 Ohio L. Abs. 401, 104 N.E.2d 88 (C.P. 1952).
SState v. Williams, 85 Ohio App. 236, 238, 88 N.E.2d 420, 421 (1947).
'McCopNacK, EvEDNcn § 43 (1954).
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the testimony of a murderer. But query - what if the conviction
were for manslaughter or automobile manslaughter? Would knowledge
of this fact really help the jury in weighing the testimony of the ac-
cused or would it only multiply the issues, and prejudice the jury? The
problem is not one of easy solution. Possibly the most satisfactory
answer is to vest broad discretion in the trial judge whereby he may
exclude a particular conviction if he feels that its admission will only
multiply issues, prejudice the jury, and not aid them in finding the
facts. This would be similar to the discretion which is retained by the
trial judge in some jurisdictions to exclude a particular conviction if
too remote in time.2
8
The Uniform Rules of Evidence and the Model Code of Evidence state
that the use of previous convictions for testing the credibility of the
accused in a criminal case shall not be admissible unless the accused first
introduces evidence supporting his credibility.29 This does not seem to
solve the problem, as the accused when he takes the stand, is a witness
in his own behalf and should be subjected to the same tests for impeach-
ment as any other witness. It seems that in most cases the jury should
have knowledge of a prior conviction of a serious crime for the pur-
poses of evaluating the testimony of the accused.
Another problem arises when previous convictions of reckless driv-
ing, drunken driving, speeding, or the like are introduced to impeach the
credibility of the defendant in a civil or criminal case involving the
negligent or reckless operation of an automobile. These convictions
may be introduced, for example, in a civil automobile negligence or
wrongful death action, or, in a criminal automobile manslaughter, reck-
less driving or drunken driving prosecution. As a practical matter the
admission of such convictions may have the effect of creating an infer-
ence as to the negligent driving habits of the driver defendant. The
case may well turn on the admission of this evidence. Convictions of
this nature should never be admitted for the purpose of impeaching
the credibility of the driver defendant for the practical and pragmatic
reason that these convictions do not show a lack of veracity or truth-
telling ability on the part of the defendant. It seems difficult to under-
stand how a conviction of drunken driving or speeding would possibly
indicate that the witness was less likely to tell the truth than a person not
so convicted.30
'Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia v. Weathered, 62 F.2d 78 (5th Cir. 1932); State v.
Kent, 5 N.D. 516, 557, State v. Pancost (alias Kent) 67 N.W. 1052, 1064 (1896);
Everett v. State, 122 Tex. Crim. 626, 634, 57 S.W.2d 140, 144 (1932).
" UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE, Rule 21; MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 106.
' Indeed, many people plead guilty to offenses of this nature for reasons of conven-
ience.
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New York has alleviated this problem to some degree by enacting a
statute which provides that a conviction for a traffic infraction may not
be introduced in evidence to impeach the credibility of a witness.81
The Uniform Rules of Evidence and the Model Code of Evidence
have perhaps gone too far in trying to avoid the foregoing consequences
when they provide that the evidence of a crime not involving dis-
honesty or the making of false statement shall be inadmissible for the
purpose of impairing the credibility of a witness.32  It seems reasonable
that the jury should know if the witness has been convicted of a serious
crime such as murder. Yet this information is not admissible by the
proposed rules.
IMPFACHMENT LIMITED TO SHOWING ONLY CONVICnONS
It is worthy to note that although the conviction of a crime may be
shown, the general rule, supported -by the great weight of authority, is
that it is not permissible to show merely that a witness has been arrested,
charged with a crime, or indicted for the purpose of throwing doubt on
the credibility of the witness8 3
Reasons assigned for the rule are: (a) that such evidence does not
logically affect credibility; (b) that such inquiry or evidence might un-
duly prejudice the jury against the witness; (c) that one accused of a
crime is presumed innocent until proven guilty; (d) or that a witness
may not be impeached -by particular acts of misconduct0 4  In Ohio,
admission of evidence of this nature is considered "improper" and "highly
prejudicial."aa It should be remembered that although the introduction of
evidence of a prior arrest or indictment is improper, it is not prejudicial
m N.Y. CIv. PRAc. AcT § 355. See De Stasio v. Janssen Dairy Corp., 279 N.Y.
501, 18 N.E.2d 833 (1939); Walther v. News Syndicate Co., 276 App. Div. 169,
93 N.Y.S.2d 537 (1949). The effectiveness of the statute seems somewhat impaired
by a holding that a conviction for drunken driving is not a traffic infraction which
falls under the purview of the statute. Geiger v. Weiss, 245 App. Div. 817, 281
N.Y.S. 154 (1935).
'= UNIFORM RuLEs OF EvIDmEN E, Rule 21; MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 106.
5
'For a full discussion and many case citations see annotation in 20 A.L.R.2d 1421
(1951).
" Ibid.
'Wagner v. State, 115 Ohio Sr 136, 152 N.. 28 (1926); Keveney v. State,
109 Ohio St. 64, 141 N.E. 845 (1923); Harper v. State, 106 Ohio St. 481, 485, 140
N.E. 364, 365 (1922); Morrow v. State, 38 Ohio L. Rep. 241, 242, 14 Ohio L Abs.
484, 486 (Ct. App. 1933). In the Keveney case it was stated that an indictment
against a witness could be shown if in the discretion of the trial judge the admission
of the evidence was relevant to show the interest of the witness in the present pro-
ceedings.
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error to ask the witness whether he has been indicted or arrested.36 If
the objection is made to this question and sustained then the witness
could not be prejudiced 'by the question alone. Without this rule it
would be impossible to conduct a trial in such a manner that a judgment
would stand, as the admissibility of evidence can only be tested by
the asking of the question.37
ABILITY OF THE WITNESS TO EXPLAIN OR DENY THE CONVICnON
It is generally thought that once the conviction is shown the witness
should not be allowed to make a short explanation or denial of guilt
3 8
This is a logical consequence of the presumption of the conclusiveness
of the judgment. Some jurisdictions in opposition to this position al-
low a 'brief explanation or denial of guilt3 9 or leave it to the discretion
of the trial judge.40 Dean Wigmore states:
... it would seem a harmless charity to allow the witness to make such
protestations on his own behalf as he may feel able to make with a due
regard to the penalties of perjury.'
In Ohio it has been said in dicta that the judgment of conviction is con-
clusive and can not be questioned.42  This, it is stated, is based on prin-
ciples of res judicata and the feeling that the witness has had his "day
in CoUrt."43
CONCLUSION
The problems presented by the present rule concerning which con-
victions may be shown to impeach credibility could be minimized by the
adoption of a new one. The proposed rule should have two facets. First,
evidence of the conviction of a crime which has no substantial bearing
on the truth-telling ability or credibility of the witness should not be
admitted for purposes of impeachment. Second, the trial judge should
' Lloyd v. Eastern Grill, Inc., 24 Ohio L. Abs. 348 (Ct. App. 1937); Clark v. State,
23 Ohio App. 474, 156 N.E. 219 (1926).
' Clark v. State, 23 Ohio App. 474, 156 N.E. 219 (1926).
'McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE 5 43 (1954).
'Hopper v. State, 151 Ark. 299, 236 S.W. 595 (1922); State v. Oxendine, 224
N.C. 825, 32 S.E.2d 648 (1945).
'United States v. Boyer, 150 F.2d 595 (D.C. Cir. 1945); Donnelly v. Donnelly,
156 Md. 81, 143 Ad. 648 (1928).
114 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1117 (3d ed. 1940).
" Harper v. State, 106 Ohio St. 481, 487, 140 N.E. 364, 366 (1922).
' Ibid. It should be noted that in this case it was also said in dicta that a pardon
or subsequent acquittal may be shown. That the pardon does not preclude the use
of the conviction see Annot., 30 A.L.R.2d 893 (1953).
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